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Conclusion
Proponents of blockchain proclaim that the technology’s greatest innovation
is trust.1 Blockchains create trust by serving as an indispensable ledger (a central
point of truth), for all stakeholders to a transaction. Instead of companies
managing and reconciling records of the same transaction in privately held
databases, both sides of a transaction are recorded simultaneously on a shared
ledger — the blockchain. As a result, the crypto economic environment is
characterized by the decentralized coordination of business processes and
transactions. Proponents of crypto-economics regard decentralized coordination
as an opportunity for new forms of economic innovation, forms designed to
increase value for individuals and decrease the power of intermediaries.2
Blockchains enable decentralized coordination by increasing the transparency
of information between parties. Transparency allows the blockchain network to
police itself by allowing users to collectively verify the legitimacy of every
network transaction.3 Agents to a transaction can presume fair play in this
system because the transparency, security, and immutability of data should
theoretically lead to increased accountability for all participants.4
But while transparency can facilitate decentralized business relationships by
allowing individuals and businesses to trust in the network itself (rather than the
intermediary), unchecked transparency can pose a paradoxical threat to the
1 Jason Leibowitz, ‘‘Blockchain’s Big Innovation is Trust, Not Money” CoinDesk (23
May 2016), online: <www.coindesk.com/blockchain-innovation-trust-money/>;
‘‘The Trust Machine” The Economist (31 October 2015), online: <www.economist.com/leaders/
2015/10/31/the-trust-machine>; McKinsey & Company, ‘‘How blockchains could change the
world” (May 2016), online: <www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/how-
blockchains-could-change-the-world>.
2 Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, ‘‘Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain”
(2016) Rotman School of Management Working Paper No 2874598, online: <pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2874598>.
3 Primavera Di Filippi, ‘‘The Interplay Between Decentralization and Privacy: The Case
of Blockchain Technologies” (2016) 7 J. Peer Production: Alternative Internets 5 at 5,
online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852689> [Di Filippi].
4 Immutability is not absolute; transactions canbe reversed by blockchain forks. Formore
on this technical circumstance see Amy Castor, ‘‘A Short Guide to Bitcoin Forks”
CoinDesk (16 May 2017), online: <www.coindesk.com/short-guide-bitcoin-forks-
explained/>.
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privacy rights of network participants. The purpose of this research is to identify
how blockchain technologies may clash with, and reconcile, privacy legislation.
The research identifies the legislative issues related to the data subjects’ privacy
rights, and proposes technical and policy oriented solutions for privacy law
compliance. The research is organized into four parts. Part one defines
blockchain technology and distinguishes between blockchain forms to identify
the nuances of public, private, and hybrid blockchains. Part two outlines the
primary privacy law challenges to blockchain as a database and a medium of
exchange, using Canada’s PIPEDA legislation and the European Union’s GDPR
as a benchmark for legal analysis. Part three offers a non-technical primer of
privacy-centric technologies designed to facilitate the compliant processing of
data on public blockchains; this section discusses analytical techniques used to
identify users on public blockchains. Part three also explores the implications of
privacy-centric technologies as a solution to legislative compliance. Part four
offers policy recommendations designed to complement proposed technical
safeguards and generate a system of accountability in a network characterized by
anonymity.
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND HYBRID CHAINS
Blockchain can be explained as a digital infrastructure that serves two major
and associated functions. First, blockchain is a medium of exchange that enables
peer to peer transactions without the need for an intermediary. Second,
blockchain is a database that serves a book keeping function for recording and
verifying every transaction made on the blockchain in real time. Blockchain
actions begin with someone creating a transaction, which can involve
cryptocurrencies, smart contracts5, records, digital representations of real
world assets,6 or other sets of information issued from a pseudonymous
address (known as the public key address).7 When a transaction is issued, the
transaction request is broadcasted to all the computers in the network (these
computers are referred to as nodes)8. The ‘miner’ nodes work to validate the
transaction by solving complex algorithms designed to verify a transaction’s
legitimacy before appending it to the blockchain.9 The mining process begins
5 A smart contract is a computerized self-executing protocol that enforces the execution of
a predefined contract in a real-timemanner: Nick Szabo, ‘‘The Idea of Smart Contracts”
(1994), online: <www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/
Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html>.
6 OliverDale, ‘‘What is Tokenization?Real-WorldAssets on theBlockchain”Blockonomi
(31 July 2018), online: <blockonomi.com/tokenization-blockchain/>.
7 Stan Sater, ‘‘Blockchain and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regula-
tion: A Chance to Harmonize International Data Flows” (2017) at 19, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080987> [Sater].
8 Satoshi Nakomoto, ‘‘Bitcoin: A Peer-To-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008) at 1,
online: <bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>.
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with miners bundling pending transactions to create a new block.10 Each block
has a header that contains the timestamp of the block, which includes a
cryptographic hash of the block’s items.11 Along with the new block’s
cryptographic hash, the header also includes a reference to the previous
block’s hash, which creates a chain of verified transactions (the ‘block’ ‘chain’).12
Every node on the network has a full replication of the valid transactions on the
blockchain that dates back to the first block (the genesis block).13 Once a block is
successfully added to the chain, anyone on the network can query the
transactions. Information is considered reliable because data recorded on each
block is agreed upon by a majority of the network participants. Details of the
data to a transaction and the rights of network participants vary by blockchain
type and use case.
There are three types of blockchains: (1) public blockchains, (2) private
blockchains, and (3) hybrid blockchains. Each type of blockchain is defined by
its consensus mechanism, which is characterized by the way nodes participate to
verify and record transactions.
Public blockchains
Public blockchains are considered ‘‘permissionless” in that data stored on the
blockchain is open source and accessible by anyone (you do not need permission
to participate). Here anyone can operate a node on the blockchain network, and
every node has the capacity to read and write a transaction. Blockchain records
are verified when 51% of nodes reach consensus. The identities of users and
nodes on a public blockchain are pseudonymous; however, certain elements of
transaction data are inherently transparent. As previously mentioned, a degree of
data transparency is required so that network participants can trust the
information stored on the blockchain. Primavera de Filippi explains that there
are two layers of data in public blockchains: content data and protocol data.14
Content data includes the terms and information of a specific transaction,
whereas the protocol data includes contextual information about the transaction
(i.e. the metadata).15 Public blockchains are capable of privacy at the content
9 Ibid. at 3.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. A hash function takes an input (or ’message’) and returns a fixed-size alphanumeric
string that serves as the digital fingerprint of that input. It is a pseudonymization
technique in cryptography used in storing and sharing information for efficiency.
12 Ibid.
13 Shaun S. Amuial, Josias N. Dewey & Jeffrey R. Seul, The Blockchain: A Guide for Legal
and Business Professionals, eds. (Eagan, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2016).
14 Di Filippi, supra note 3 at 14.
15 Metadata (or “data about data”) is everything about a piece of information, apart from
the information itself. The content of a message is not metadata, but who sent it, when,
where from, and to whom, are all examples of metadata. Legal systems often protect
content more thanmetadata: for instance, in the United States, law enforcement needs a
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level by way of encryption.16 However, protocol data must be transparent for the
blockchain to function.
Private blockchain
Private blockchains are considered ‘‘permissioned” because those who
operate nodes on a private blockchain must be granted access to the blockchain
by an administrator. There is only one administrator who has the capacity to
read and write transactions to a private blockchain, and that is the owner of the
blockchain. Thus, private blockchains are considered the most centralized
version of blockchain technology because they are typically used as a tool by
individual firms for internal processes. The administrator of a private blockchain
protects information by maintaining control over the rights of network
participants. Thus, degrees of transparency and data types are under the
control of one data processor. All participants in a private blockchain are
identifiable because the administrator must grant participants network access
Hybrid blockchains
Hybrid blockchains (or consortium chains) are controlled by a select group
of administrators who have agreed to set terms that govern consensus.17 They are
public in that independently owned nodes must reach consensus for data to be
validated, and they are private in that only those granted access to the blockchain
can perform transactions. Only select users have the capacity to write
transactions; however, reading rights can be designed as either public or
private.18 Like private chains, member nodes of consortium chains are also easily
identifiable.
PRIVACY LAW CHALLENGES TO CRYPTO ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS
A public blockchain is arguably the most disruptive form of the technology
because of the highly decentralized nature of economic relations that the network
enables. In contrast, private and hybrid blockchains embrace a degree of
centralization common to traditional economic systems — this is demonstrated
by the powers of control that groups or single administrators have over the rights
of participants in the network (i.e. a user’s ability to read information or execute
warrant to listen to aperson’s telephone calls, but claims the right toobtain the list ofwho
youhave called farmore easily.However,metadata can often reveal a great deal, andwill
often need to be protected as carefully as the data it describes. See especially Electronic
Frontier Foundation, ‘‘Metadata” (accessed 19 July 2019), online: <ssd.eff.org/en/
glossary/metadata>.
16 Di Filippi, supra note 3 at 1.
17 Vitalik Buterin, ‘‘On Public and Private Blockchains” Ethereum Blog (2015), online:
<blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/>.
18 Ibid.
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transactions). It is likely that the quasi-centralized character of private and
hybrid blockchains generate discernable accountabilities in business relations
that render such networks more easily reconcilable with existing privacy
legislation. The following legislative review focuses on the implications of
public blockchains because of the technology’s distinctively decentralized
functionality. This section is organized by jurisdiction, focusing first on
privacy legislation in Canada, and second on privacy legislation in the
European Union.
Canada
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA), sets the ground rules for how private sector entities handle
personal information in Canada. Personal information is defined by PIPEDA
as ‘‘information that on its own or combined with other pieces of data, can
identify you as an individual.”19 Businesses who conduct operations atop
blockchain infrastructure will need to comply with PIPEDA because the
metadata necessarily ingrained in public blockchain transactions may constitute
personal information. While context dependent, metadata will likely constitute
personal information in the case of public blockchain transactions because it may
reveal where transactions are sent from, who they are sent to (not necessarily the
name of the recipient, but the address of the recipient), how much money was
sent, and at what time. In Gordon v. Canada the Federal Court held that
information is about an identifiable individual if it ‘‘permits” or ‘‘leads” to the
possible identification of the individual, whether on the basis of that information
alone, or when the information is combined with other information from other
available sources.20 This is corroborated by the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, which lists ‘‘financial information” as an example of
personal information.21 The same rules apply to every piece of software deployed
on the blockchain (e.g. smart contracts), which are typically designed to execute
business operations for companies building decentralized applications.22 The
operations of this code are made publicly available to every node in the
blockchain network as ‘‘bytecode,” which can be reverse engineered to reveal the
same transactional information as the metadata in peer-to-peer transactions. To
illustrate this point, the UK Government Chief Science Advisor explains that
‘‘chains of transactions may be traced throughout the Bitcoin blockchain to link,
19 >Personal InformationProtection andElectronicDocumentsAct,R.S.C. 2000, c. 5, s. 2 at
4 [PIPEDA]. See also Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Summary of
Privacy Laws in Canada” (January 2018), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/
privacy-laws-in-canada/02_05_d_15/> [OPCC Summary].
20 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,Metadata and Privacy: A Technical and
Legal Overview (Gatineau, Q.C.: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
October 2014) at 6, online: <www.priv.gc.ca/media/1786/md_201410_e.pdf>.
21 OPCC Summary, supra note 19.
22 Di Filippi, supra note 3 at 8.
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for example, instances of bitcoin theft with specific attempts to withdraw bitcoins
through exchanges.”23 While this analytical ability may serve a valuable purpose
for fighting crime, it clearly demonstrates a privacy challenge in that
identification of public blockchain users is possible.
Schedule 1 of PIPEDA outlines 10 guiding principles that a private enterprise
must comply with to respect the privacy rights of individual consumers. The
following section identifies each principle and expands on associated legal issues.
Principle 1: Accountability
An organization is responsible for personal information under its control and shall
designate an individual or individuals who are accountable for the organization’s
compliance....24
PIPEDA’s accountability principle was created to ensure organizational
responsibility for protecting individual privacy rights. Designating accountability
for public blockchain privacy infringement is a difficult task because public
blockchains are not owned by a single entity. Rather, the ownership, and
ultimately the ability to exercise control, over public blockchains becomes
increasingly decentralized over time. To better understand the challenges
associated with designating accountability, it is important to distinguish
between the types of participants involved in a public blockchain network.25
Borrowing from Dirk Zeutsch’s ledger hierarchy, the relevant individuals and
organizations in question generally fall under the following categories:
(1) The core group that develops the underlying software and principles that
govern the public blockchain.26
(2) The owners of additional servers that run the public blockchain code for
validation purposes (i.e. the nodes). 27
(3) The companies that build decentralized applications on public blockchain
infrastructure.
It is easy to presume that the core developers of the blockchain should be
held accountable, because, after all, they compose the group that built the
23 Mark Walport, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Blockchain (London, U.K.:
Government Office for Science, 2015) at 50, online: <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distribu-
ted-ledger-technology.pdf>.
24 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched.1, 4.10.
25 Asmentioned above, this section excludes the perspective of the public blockchains users
who would constitute the ‘data subjects’ who disclose personal information when they
make transactions on the blockchain.
26 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, ‘‘The Distributed Liability of
Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain” (2017) University of Hong Kong
Faculty of Law Working Paper No 52 at 21, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3018214>.
27 Ibid.
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system. Core developers set the rules that govern a public blockchain, and in
many cases, they are the individuals who handle the maintenance of the network
during its development.28 However, as the community of owners on a public
blockchain increases over time, the governance of the blockchain becomes
increasingly decentralized (meaning that updates to the network must be
approved by mutual consent from the community). Thus, public blockchain
control is ultimately predicated upon the community of owners (that anyone can
be a part of) who propose software updates and vote on suggested changes from
other developers.29 This makes it difficult to designate accountability to the core
developers because while they approve changes, they can only do so with
computational support from a majority of the community; their powers of
control are not exclusive.30
The challenge of attributing accountability to core developers becomes more
difficult when the core developers themselves are unidentifiable or unassociated
with one another in the real world. The core developers behind the Bitcoin
blockchain, for example, worked independently from one another, and the
identity of the mastermind behind the network (Satoshi Nakomoto) remains
unknown to this day. Nonetheless, in blockchain there is already a tendency
towards centralization by powerful entities who have come to amass higher
degrees of control than others. The primary example of this is Bitcoin, whereby
miners are grouped in centralized communication pools, three of which control
over 50% of the hash rate, while six pools control the 75% and the biggest
individual pool controls 21.3%.31 While the accumulation of hashing power will
be unlikely to designate such mining groups accountable for privacy
infringement, the existence of such groups challenges the purportedly
28 On the Bitcoin blockchain for example, ‘‘decisions aremade—or executed at least—by
a team of core developers because only they have the technical permissions to accept
submissions. Those core developers form, at least at first sight, Bitcoin’s governance
group in a narrower sense. Every adjustment toBitcoin’s governance structuremust pass
through the bottleneck of this small group of people.” See Urs Gasser, Ryan Budish &
SarahMyersWest, ‘‘Multistakeholder as Governance Groups: Observations fromCase
Studies” (2015) Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2015-1 at 8, online:
<dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/16140635/Berkman_2015-1-revision.pdf?se-
quence=1>.
29 On Bitcoin, for any update ‘‘to become Active requires the mutual consent of the
community. Those proposing changes should consider that ultimately consent may rest
with the consensus of the Bitcoin users.” See Bitcoin Core, ‘‘Bitcoin/bips” GitHub
(accessed 19 July 2019), online: <github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/README.-
mediawiki>
30 On the bitcoin blockchain, for example, anyone who owns bitcoin also has owner
abilities that allow such users to contribute to the decisions that determine the direction
of the network. Themore ownership of the network, themore influence you have over its
direction.
31 Roberta Filippone, ‘‘Blockchain and Individuals’ Control Over Data in EuropeanData
Protection Law” (Thesis submitted in fulfillment of a LLM in Law & Technology,
Tilburg University, August 2017), online: <arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=143638> at 33.
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decentralized, democratic nature of community decision making that shields the
core developers from accountability.
It is much less likely that owners of nodes will be designated accountable
because anyone, anywhere, can download the entire history of data transactions
that has taken place on a public blockchain. The fact that personal information
may be gleaned from transaction records that node owners have downloaded
poses an additional layer of privacy challenges related to principles of consent,
limited collection, and limited use, disclosure and retention which will be
discussed below.
The company that builds a decentralized application (DApp) on a public
blockchain may be accountable in circumstances where a privacy breach can be
traced to the accounts of the DApp team. However, the nature of ‘decentralized’
applications is designed to mimic the decentralized governance processes of
public blockchains for a specific use case. In other words, the company’s control
over the network decreases over time as the applications community of users
increases and becomes engaged in decision making. Therefore, the same issues
for designating accountability with public blockchains exist with the
decentralized applications built on top of them.
This is not to say that core developers will be absolved of liability from
privacy-invasive design decisions. Rather, the nature of progressive
decentralization will likely complicate fault attribution when design decisions
are made by collective, unidentifiable parties, that span jurisdictions.
Principle 2: Identifying Purposes
The purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified by the
organization at or before the time the information is collected.32
PIPEDA’s identifying purposes principle was created so that people could
understand how their data was going to be used or disclosed. In the public
blockchain context, while personal information may be derived from
transactions, there is no explicit collection of information for an identifiable
purpose. The only information included in the network is the metadata required
to ensure network functionality. While personal information may be gleaned
from this metadata, there is no mechanism in place to identify users when their
data is being analyzed or for what purpose. There is also no disclosure of
identifying purposes (or privacy risks) before the time information is collected.
The concept of a public blockchain in general clashes with this principle because
of the ‘open-source’ nature of the technology.
While public blockchain transparency creates inevitable privacy issues, some
proponents of public blockchains argue that the technology enables the
individual to exercise greater control over their personal information.33 With a
highly-decentralized architecture like a public blockchain, users would not have
32 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.2.
33 Angiva Banerjee & Karuna Pande Joshi, ‘‘Link Before You Share: Managing Privacy
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to contend with the fear of data concentration and possible profiling by a third-
party service because there is no central point of control.34 However, the lack of
centralized control does not reconcile the privacy issue that personal data can be
obtained by any observer of the network. Therefore, one could also argue that,
while decentralization reduces the threat of all data being controlled by a small
group of central authorities (the Googles, Facebooks, and IBM’s of the world), it
does nothing to combat the threat of data manipulation by any singular
unidentifiable entity who chooses to download a node.35
Principle 3: Consent
The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or
disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate.36
Consent in the context of PIPEDA means informed and voluntary agreement
with what is being done or proposed by the organization. It is only considered
valid when it is reasonable to expect that someone can understand the nature,
purpose and ‘‘consequences of the collection, use or disclosure to which they are
consenting.”37 Consent can be either express or implied. Whether or not public
blockchain users express or imply consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of
personal information does not negate the fact that transactions executed over
public blockchains become publicly available upon execution. Under PIPEDA,
private enterprises are allowed to collect, use, and disclose personal information
without consent when certain forms of personal information are made publicly
available.38 Examples of relevant forms listed under the regulation include: (a)
personal information in a publicly available telephone directory, where the
subscriber can refuse to have the personal information appear in the directory;
(b) personal information that appears in a publicly available business directory,
listing, or notice, where the collection, use, or disclosure relates to the purpose in
Policies through Blockchain” (2017) arXiv 1710.05363 at 2, online: <arxiv.org/pdf/
1710.05363.pdf>.
34 Filippone, supra note 31 at 5.
35 While it is important to note that PIPEDA’s ten principles relate to individual data
protection, there are similar privacy implications for businesses with respect to
confidentiality. Public blockchain transparency in a competitive environment could
challenge transactional confidentiality, which may dissuade firms from conducting
business on public blockchains. This confidentiality issue could materialize in
circumstances where firms have the capacity to track financial information from
competitor transactions.
36 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.3.
37 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2017-2018 Annual Report to Parliament
on the Personal Information Protection and ElectronicDocuments Act and the PrivacyAct
(Gatineau,Q.C.:March 2018), online:<www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/
ar_index/201718/ar_201718/#heading-0-0-3-1>.
38 Barbara McIsaac, Rick Shields & Kris Klein, The Law of Privacy in Canada Vol 1
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) (loose-leaf, release 2016), ch. 4 at 4-7.
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which the information appears in the directory, listing, or notice; and, (c)
personal information in a publication, including a magazine, book or newspaper,
that is available to the public, where the individual has provided the
information.39 Much like in the case of directories and publications, public
blockchain actors choose to send transactions on a platform that automatically
publicizes the information of that transaction to all nodes in the network.
Therefore, it is arguable that this functionality would trigger the ‘publicly
available’ exception to PIPEDA’s consent principle. If that is the case, then
anyone with access to the blockchain would be able to acquire information from
the transactions made by users of the blockchain without their consent. If the
courts rule that the publication of transactions on the blockchain does not trigger
the publicly available exception, then additional privacy law challenges arise,
particularly challenges regarding section 4.3.8, which rules that ‘‘individuals may
withdraw consent at any time.”40 Then, the blockchain feature of immutability
directly conflicts with the individual’s ability to withdraw consent.
One of the unique features of blockchains is that data stored on chain cannot
be altered without acceptance of other nodes, which requires cooperation from
more than half of the nodes for every transaction made.41 When transactions are
appended to the blockchain they are perpetually stored and build up over time.
Even if a majority of nodes cooperate to implement a change, in order to remove
an old transaction it would require nodes to verify the legitimacy of every
affected transaction backwards, ‘‘un-build the entire blockchain block by block
and then rebuild it afterwards.”42 This process requires extreme computational
power and such an amendment would suspend all blockchain transactions until
the reconstruction is complete. Thus, in practice the act of withdrawing consent,
applied by the deletion or amendment of data on the blockchain, is very unlikely.
This complication is exacerbated by the fact that there is no accountable entity to
coordinate desired changes on public blockchains.
Principle 4: Limiting Collection
The collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is necessary for
the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be collected by fair
and lawful means.43
The limiting collection was created to ensure that organizations only
gathered relevant information about their data subjects. Applied to traditional
economic systems the application of this principle is simple because
39 Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information, SOR/2001-7, s 1.
40 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.3.8.
41 Matthias Berberich & Malgorzata Steiner, ‘‘Blockchain Technology and the GDPR:
How to Reconcile Privacy and Distributed Ledgers” (2016) 2:3 European Data
Protection L. Rev. 422 at 426 [Berberich].
42 Ibid.
43 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.4.
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organizations have control over the data of their subjects. The peer-to-peer
nature of public blockchain networks creates a greater level of complexity
because individuals are the entities with control over data distribution. While
only certain information is required to execute a public blockchain transaction,
users have the ability to append additional information to the blockchain. One
potential problem regarding limited collection persists in the circumstance where
personal information about one individual is appended to the blockchain
without their permission. Under such circumstances public blockchain features
of transparency and immutability threaten the limiting collection principle in
that potentially harmful actors could extract that information about users
without their consent. There are currently no mechanisms in place to enforce this
limited collection principle or safeguard the posting of illicit information.
Principle 5: Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention
Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for
which it was collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by
law. Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the
fulfilment of those purposes.44
As in the case of consent, the fact that histories of blockchain transactions
can be downloaded by anyone creates an opportunity for harmful actors to
dissect information and utilize it for purposes other than that for which it was
originally provided. The purposes for which information may be provided can
vary by use case and user intent. Some public blockchains were built to be
replacements for fiat currency — as in the case of Bitcoin, and others were built
to serve as a foundation for decentralized applications (DApps) — as in the case
of Ethereum. In each case, data is stored on the blockchain differently. With
Bitcoin’s function being digital money, the data stored on the blockchain can be
found in bitcoin transactions. Ethereum on the other hand is designed to act like
a big computer that enables functionalities (in addition to the use of ether as a
digital money). These functionalities are demonstrated by smart contracts. Smart
contracts act like robot accounts by executing a piece of code when they receive a
transaction.45 The piece of code can be designed to automate a variety of
different processes; it is through this functionality that DApps operate. The data
collected by the DApp is stored in the smart contract, which is built on the
Ethereum blockchain. All the data in every DApp on Ethereum is available to
anyone who downloads an Ethereum node (referred to as the Ethereum Client).46
Therefore, information can be gleaned from user accounts, simple
cryptocurrency transactions (like a peer to peer transaction of bitcoin), and
44 Ibid. at 4.5.
45 Laurent Senta, ‘‘Where andHowApplicationData is Stored in Ethereum?” (accessed 19
July 2019), online: >www.singulargarden.com/blog/storage-and-dapps-on-ethereum-
blockchain/<
46 Ibid.
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smart contracts. Neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum have enforcement mechanisms in
place to protect user’s personal information once it is made publicly available on
the blockchain ledger. Generally, privacy solutions that have been proposed put
the onus on the user to protect his/her information disclosed in transactions —
examples of these solutions will be discussed in the final section of this research.
Principle 6: Accuracy
Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary
for the purposes for which it is to be used.47
On public blockchains there are native tokens (like Bitcoin for the Bitcoin
blockchain, and Ether for Ethereum), and application tokens that give users
access to the decentralized applications built atop public blockchain
infrastructure. There is no mandated identification process for acquiring native
tokens on public blockchains; accordingly, there is no way to ensure the accuracy
of personal information. In the case of application tokens, companies looking to
sell such tokens submit purchasers to requisite know your client (KYC) and anti-
money laundering (AML) checks to comply with regulations in their jurisdiction.
Such customer information is typically held off-chain (i.e. not coded into the
public blockchain) in company-owned accounts. This information should be
accurate to ensure compliance. However, transactional information is held on-
chain, and once an application token circulates, anyone with a digital wallet can
purchase or receive a token and gain access to the decentralized application.
Therefore, while original KYC / AML records will likely reflect an accurate
account of personal information for those who purchase the token from the
issuing company, there is no mechanism in place to update information or ensure
its accuracy over an extended period of time. This is because no exclusive
controller exists to monitor all account related information and access points. A
user who provides accurate information at the point of sale in 2016 may have
committed a series of financial crimes in 2017, but would still be able to operate
their public blockchain account under 2016 pretenses. Challenges to maintaining
accurate accounts are exacerbated in circumstances where data is tampered with
before a transaction is executed on the blockchain.48 Under such circumstances,
inaccurate information would be perpetually stored on the public blockchain
ledger.
47 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.6.
48 Frank Hofman et al., ‘‘The Immutability Concept of Blockchains and the Benefits of
Early Standardization” (November 2017) ITU Kaleidoscope: Challenges for a Data-
Driven Society, online: <ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8247004>.
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Principle 7: Safeguards
Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to the
sensitivity of the information.49
While transactional security is a major value proposition of public
blockchains, the only layer of technical protection for personal information on
most public blockchains is pseudonymous identity. Pseudonymous identity is
different than anonymity. Anonymity means that it is impossible to link any
given identifier to a specific identity; whereas a pseudonym merely refers to the
use of an identifier to disguise the real identity.50 Real identity can be uncovered
by applying big data analytics to transaction histories stored on the blockchain
ledger. The likelihood of discovery is dramatically increased when analytics
include media-based correlating information.51 Researchers have begun to
develop new strategies for discerning real identities behind pseudonymous
addresses, which would substantially weaken the privacy protection granted by
pseudonyms in the digital world.52 Various solutions to this problem have been
proposed and will be discussed further in the final section of this research.
Principle 8: Openness
An organization shall make readily available to individuals specific information
about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal
information.53
The public blockchain ecosystem does not have any uniform policies or
practices in place to reflect principles of openness. However, it is important that
public blockchain operators adopt a system of best practices for managing
personal information moving forward. Such practices should reflect disclosures
of privacy risks at the point of token issuance (i.e. through ICO, airdrop, etc. . .).
Sound practice should also identify where information is collected and shared;
both on and off-chain.
But while token issuers may try their best to embrace open personal
information policies and practices, the global and peer-to-peer nature of public
blockchain operations poses a challenge to legislators. The global presence of
token issuers, and open access to public blockchain networks, means that
businesses can form anywhere, and market to customers across jurisdictions.
Moreover, individuals have the power to purchase tokens from anyone,
49 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.7.
50 Di Filippi, supra note 3 at 11.
51 Aidan Hyman, Interview with Chainsafe Systems, (August 7 2018 at 1:00pm) comment
on linking pseudonymous accounts to user identities through public blockchains.
52 One university simulated experiment used behavior based clustering techniques to reveal
the identities of 40%of Bitcoin users: Elli Androulaki et al., ‘‘EvaluatingUser Privacy in
Bitcoin” (Paper delivered at ETH Zurich, 2013) <eprint.iacr.org/2012/596.pdf>
53 PIPEDA, supra note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.8.
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anywhere, without much oversight from regulators. This makes it difficult to
enforce regulations. While uniform principles of ‘‘openness” should be embraced
across public blockchain networks, regulators currently have very little ability to
ensure compliance with these practices.
Principle 9: Individual Access
Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, use, and disclosure of
his or her personal information and shall be given access to that information. An
individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the
information and have it amended as appropriate.54
PIPEDA’s individual access rights were originally intended to give
individuals the ability to request information in corporate paper records or
databases that wouldn’t otherwise be accessible because companies owned the
records and stored them privately. Once an individual requested access to records
of their personal information, PIPEDA would allow the individual to make the
case for ‘‘correcting” information if that information had changed since their
previous recording. On public blockchains, the issue is not that individuals lack
access to information, but that correction rights are difficult to establish because
users cannot edit original records once they have been added to the blockchain
ledger. In other words, while all records are accessible to all users for viewing, no
individual can change one particular record. Moreover, public blockchains do
not have a mechanism in place for users to request their own personal
information, or to identify the context in which that information has been
recorded. This poses additional challenges to accessibility when original records
reflect inaccurate information. Such information could deceive observers without
a wider context.
Principle 10: Challenging Compliance
An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning compliance with the
above principles to the designated individual or individuals accountable for the
organization’s compliance.55
Challenging compliance on public blockchains is difficult because the
functionality of public blockchains is often at odds with data protection
legislation. Features of transparency, decentralization, and immutability pose
unresolved problems for PIPEDA’s principles of accountability, information use,
disclosure, collection, retention, and consent. However, public blockchain
networks are open source by design, and regard information transparency as
advantageous. The technology marks a clear departure from traditional social
and economic norms by embracing transparency as a means of garnering trust.
That said, the threat of bad actors exists, and the transparency inherent to public
54 Ibid. at 4.9.
55 Ibid. at 4.10.
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blockchain networks creates substantial privacy risks emphasized by the
legislative analysis above. Right now the only mechanisms in place for
challenging compliance with the above fair information principles are through
the privacy commissions that are not designed to account for the nature of public
blockchain operations. Public blockchains do not have designated individuals for
compliance.
European Union
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) sets guidelines for the
collection and processing of personal information of individuals within the
European Union (EU).56 The regulation applies to all organizations that process
or control the personal data of members of the Union regardless of whether the
processing takes place in the Union or not.57 The GDPR differs from PIPEDA in
that it takes a more stringent approach to protecting individual privacy rights by
equipping data subjects with a greater degree of control over their own data
through provisions such as the right to access58 and right to be forgotten.59
Amendments to this regulation also mandate that technical and organizational
precautions be taken (such as privacy by design and appointing a data protection
officer) to increase accountability for data processors and controllers.60 The
regulation’s underlying philosophy seeks to increase individuals control over
56 See European Commission, ‘‘Principles of the GDPR” (accessed 19 July 2019), online: .
57 General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC, [2016] OJ L 119 at art. 3 [GDPR].
58 Both PIPEDA and the GDPR grant individuals the right to access the personal
information that the organization has about them; however, the GDPR introduces an
additional right of ‘‘data portability” under Article 20. Data portability grants
individuals the right to receive their personal data in a structured, commonly used and
machine-readable format and to allow the individual to send that data to another data
controller. See GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 20.
59 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 17 maintains an explicit right of erasure, whereas PIPEDA
includes a ‘qualified’ right of erasure under principle 4.5. The principle inPIPEDA, supra
note 19 at Sched. 1, 4.5 explains that ‘‘personal information shall be retained only as long
as necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes.” Article 17 includes an individual’s
right to require organizations to erase their data in a number of circumstances,
particularly when there is a withdrawal of consent. In the GDPR this right extends to
require the primary controller to take reasonable steps to inform other data controllers
who have received the information of the withdrawal of consent.
60 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 4; ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the
purposes andmeans of the processing of personal data; where the purposes andmeans of
such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the
specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law;
‘processor’means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other bodywhich
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.
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their data, while creating a more privacy-friendly environment for the processing
of personal information.61
Similar to the case of PIPEDA, the GDPR defines personal information as
that which contributes to the identifiability of a natural person.62 An identifiable
natural person is someone ‘‘who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of
that natural person.”63 Recital 26 states that ‘‘data which have undergone
pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of
additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable
natural person.”64 On public blockchains, pseudonyms are the primary
safeguard to mask user identity, and various studies have shown that big data
analysis that combines blockchain data with external sources has the capacity to
identify blockchain users.65 Accordingly, it is likely that public blockchains and
the organizations that utilize the technology, will need to comply with the
GDPR. Moreover, while the GDPR does not explicitly comment on what degree
of identifiability would result in data being deemed personal information, the
only type of data precluded from GDPR regulation is anonymous data;
therefore, it could also be implied that non-anonymous data, including
pseudonymous data, is subject to the regulation.66
Presuming that public blockchains will fall under the purview of the GDPR,
the following analysis identifies five features of the GDPR that serve as primary
challenges to compliance:
Accountability
Article 5(2) of GDPR designates primary accountability to the controllers of
personal data, and other direct obligations to the processors of personal data.67
The GDPR defines a controller as ‘‘the natural or legal person, public authority,
61 While legislative difference exist between PIPEDA and the GDPR, in recent years the
Canadian government has embraced GDPR-like trends in their interpretation and
appreciation of privacy laws. One House of Commons report in particular outlines a
series of recommendations that embrace GDPR-like policies related to consent, data
portability, a right to erasure, and privacy by design: see Canada, Parliament, House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, 42nd
Parl., 1st Sess., Towards Privacy by Design: Review of the Personal Information and
Electronic Documents Act (February 2018), online: <publications.gc.ca/collections/
collection_2018/parl/xc73-1/XC73-1-1-421-12-eng.pdf>.
62 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 4.
63 Ibid.
64 GDPR, supra note 57 at recital 26.
65 More on this in the analysis of privacy-centric technologies below.
66 It is only the anonymized data to which theGDPRdoes not apply:GDPR, supra note 57
at recital 26.
67 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 5.
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agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data,”68 and a processor as ‘‘a
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes
personal data on behalf of the controller.”69 To illustrate this relationship,
imagine Company A selling T-shirts through a website they’ve built using
GoDaddy, while also using GoDaddy analytics to track customer engagement
activity on their site. Here the controller is Company A, and the processor is
GoDaddy. Data controllers are customers of data processors. The data
controller is principally responsible for complying with data subject privacy
requests, and data processors are obligated to only utilize data in ways that the
controller instructs them to.70
The analogy to be drawn with public blockchains may exist in the distinction
between providers of the infrastructure (blockchain protocols), and the providers
of the decentralized applications built atop the infrastructure. However, public
blockchain systems are designed so that full transparency of network metadata is
accessible by anyone, anywhere. Accordingly, all nodes in the network
technically process data because their purpose is to verify every transaction
made. The big question for GDPR regulators here is what degree of control
qualifies a node or developer as a data controller — the entity that is primarily
accountable. Berberich and Steiner posit that the qualification of a data
controller rests on whether the data holder has actual control over the personal
information of users; then, either no node qualifies as a controller, or all nodes
qualify.71 Primavera Di Fillipi suggests that the regulation may be able to
recognize the data subject as their own controller, and that ‘‘the responsibility of
keeping data private merely shifts from the operator to the individual user.”72
Being that a fundamental characteristic of public blockchains is the lack of an
identifiable entity in a position of control, regulators will likely face challenges
designating an accountable entity in circumstances of privacy infringement.73
Data Minimization
Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR explains that personal data shall be: ‘‘adequate,
relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which
they are processed (data minimization).”74 As previously mentioned,
decentralized coordination requires all nodes in a public blockchain network
68 Ibid. at art. 4.
69 Ibid.
70 MailControl, ‘‘Data Controllers and Processors” (accessed 19 July 2019), online:
<www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/key-concepts/data-controllers-and-processors/>.
71 Berberich, supra note 41 at 425.
72 Di Fillippi, supra note 3 at 15.
73 Cagla Salmensuu, ‘‘The General Data Protection Regulation and Blockchains” (2018)
Liikejuridiikka at 12, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac-
t_id=3143992>.
74 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 5.
PRIVACY LAW ISSUES IN PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS 293
to verify a transaction. The process requires nodes to access all previous
transactions — essentially tracing the financial history of the parties to the
transaction — to determine legitimacy.75 The openness of this process can be
opposed to the principle of data minimization because data from former
transactions must remain accessible irrespective of whether the purpose of
former transactions is still relevant. If data stored becomes an unnecessary
byproduct of the public blockchains intended purpose, the blockchain may be in
contravention of the data minimization principle. However, public blockchain
contravention to the principle of data minimization depends on what the
‘‘purpose” of the information stored is. If the purpose of storing information is
to ensure the security and accuracy of the whole, then the perpetual storage
system of public blockchains may not violate the data minimization principle.
For example, if a public blockchain system is applied to a government land
registry, a comprehensive database of information that ensures the provenance of
land transfers and ownership rights may not contravene the data minimization
principle. Ultimately, compliance with data minimization will depend on the
purpose for which data is processed on the public blockchain.
The principle of storage limitation
Article 5(1)(e) explains that personal data must be ‘‘kept in a form which
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the
purposes for which the personal data are processed.”76 Accordingly, it is difficult
to reconcile the public blockchain feature of perpetual storage with storage
limitation. While there are exceptions to the storage limitation principle, none of
them account for the current state of decentralized business operations that
persist on public blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum.77
The right to be forgotten
Article 17 of the GDPR gives the data subject the authority to force the data
controller to erase all data held by the controller about the data subject.78 The
right to be forgotten is exercised when the data subject withdraws his consent,
when the data is unlawfully processed, or when the data subject objects to
processing.79 Each of these precursors to the right to be forgotten may pose
issues for public blockchain operations. The withdrawal of consent first suggests
the provision of consent. If consent is provided on public blockchains, it is likely
implied because only the user has control over the processing of their own
information. However, one must also consider the permanence of blocks to
75 Filippone, supra note 31 at 30.
76 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 5.
77 Personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be
processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical
research purposes or statistical purposes: GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 5(1)(e).
78 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 17.
79 Sater, supra note 7 at 8.
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evaluate the qualification of consent. Should both ‘‘permanence” and individual
controls over the processing of their own information constitute lawful consent
as previously understood for data protection purposes? Traditionally the answer
to that question would be no; the GDPR is designed to empower individuals by
giving them more control over their data. The permanence of data disables
individual powers over their data over prolonged periods of time. Data
unlawfully processed will also be stored on the immutable blockchain ledger.80
Participants will be able to read the information deemed to be unlawful despite
any subsequent attempts to correct or conceal such information. Lastly, a
subject’s objection to processing inevitably entails all data stored in the ledger
because the blockchain’s functionality, accuracy, and security relies on the
immutability of transactional history. Of course, this begs the question of
whether public blockchains leave any room for individuals to have control and
consent over their data at all, after transactions have been made.
While this principle of the GDPR bears stark resistance to public blockchain
operations, one possible exemption exists when there are ‘‘overriding legitimate
grounds for processing.”81 Here the GDPR weighs the data subject’s objection
against the interests of a controller or third party. Although the spirit of the
GDPR is such that individual data subject rights prevail over their controllers,
the nature of public blockchains as a peer-to-peer system that operate without
controlling entities could support an alternate theory. In the public blockchain
context, one could argue that the legitimate interests of all independent users —
to ensure network functionality and the sanctity of information, should override
a single data subject’s privacy request. Of course, this argument can only stand if
the design of the public blockchain is such that certain privacy standards are met.
However, if technological safeguards that generate privacy law compliance can
be agreed upon, public blockchains could be perceived to substantiate the
GDPR’s prioritization of the data subject’s rights because the nature of peer-to-
peer operations inherent to public blockchains allow users to exercise more
powers of control over their personal information. Without identifiable
processors or controllers, individuals inevitably assume more responsibility
over their own information on public blockchains. If privacy compliance can be
reached with technical solutions or complimentary policy initiatives, the
underlying public blockchain network could empower the data subject. A
80 Processing is only lawful when: (1) the subject gives consent, (2) processing is necessary
for the performance of a contract, (3) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation, (4) rocessing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject or of another natural person, (5) processing is necessary for the performance of a
task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller, (6) processing is necessary for purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or a third party: see Jacqueline van Essen & Vincent Wellens, ‘‘GDPR Series
Part 6: Legal Grounds for Processing” NautaDutilh (blog) (16 February 2017), online:
<www.e-nautadutilh.com/56/2608/landing-pages/news-item.asp?sid=f734514a-191f-
49b0-8c60-2c1b34245d96>.
81 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 17.
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conversation on privacy-centric technology solutions and complimentary policy
initiatives is included in the latter sections of this research.
Data Protection by Design and by Default (privacy by design)
Article 25 of the GDPR codifies the concept of privacy by design, by calling
on data controllers to ‘‘implement appropriate technical and organizational
measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary
for each specific purpose of the processing are processed.”82 In other words,
companies must develop their system architecture so that it protects user privacy
rights from the onset. Public blockchains technically utilize privacy by design
techniques like pseudonymization and encryption83; however, the implications of
blockchain’s decentralized control and distributed storage also conflict with
privacy by design because blockchain systems are transparent, and do not
minimize data or designate accountability.
PROPOSALS FOR SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY RIGHTS ON PUBLIC
BLOCKCHAINS: PRIVACY CENTRIC TECHNOLOGIES
As is the nature of peer-to-peer systems, public blockchains facilitate
transactions where the user exercises control over the transmission of data.
However, most public blockchains can function only when a threshold amount
of information is included in the transaction itself. This requisite amount is then
broadcasted across all nodes in the network. The foundational privacy issue
associated with public blockchain use results from the potential analysis of this
information. As discussed in the introductory sections to PIPEDA and GDPR
above, it is possible to analyze the metadata of public blockchain transactions
and derive personal information that identifies users. This fundamental feature
of public blockchains makes it difficult to accommodate the rights of data
subjects related to use, disclosure, collection and consent. The following section
identifies modern cryptographic proposals for safeguarding the privacy rights of
users by anonymizing their identities on the blockchain. The section provides a
non-technical primer of these technologies.
zk-SNARK (zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of
Knowledge)
Created by Eli-Ben Sasson et al as a privacy solution to public blockchain
transactions (Bitcoin in particular), zk-SNARK technology allows users to hide
their identities, transaction amounts, and account balances.84 The technology
82 GDPR, supra note 57 at art. 25.
83 GDPR, supra note 57 at recital 78.
84 Eli Ben-Sasson et al., ‘‘Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin”
(Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Jose, 17May 2014),
online: <zerocash-project.org/media/pdf/zerocash-oakland2014.pdf> [Ben-Sasson et
al.].
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does this by constructing a payment scheme between two parties that allows each
party to prove to the other that they have a specific set of information, without
revealing what that information is.85 The most prominent use case for this
technology is ZeroCash, the public blockchain cryptocurrency launched by Ben
Sasson et al. The basis for this technical privacy solution is zero knowledge proof
cryptography.
ZeroCash has received praise for its privacy-fulfilling technology, and
criticism for its centralized control,86 inefficiency, and poor scalability relative to
other cryptocurrencies.87 While zk-SNARK technology offers a viable privacy
solution to some public blockchain transparency issues, the degree of anonymity
that zk-SNARK enables raises other important regulatory concerns in that it
creates greater barriers to ‘‘accountability” and ‘‘oversight.”88
Mixing Techniques
Mixing services are offered through third parties to public blockchain
transactions and can help users mitigate risks of identification. The service
allows users to entrust an amount of coins to a pool operated by a party that
‘mixes’ coins from unassociated sources, thereby confusing the trail of
cryptocurrency transactions, before redistributing the coins to the respective
users.89 Here users can send coins to each other in a way that hides the link
between their old and new coins.90 This helps mitigate the risk of identification
because most de-anonymization techniques use ‘‘linkage attacks” that seek out
connections between transaction inputs and outputs to identify users.91 For
mixing to be effective, the mixer needs many users with many coins to mix.92
Primary limitations to mixing services are that they typically charge fees,
create delays, and become single points of failure for transactions themselves.93
The mixer can steal the coins, can shut down, or can be hacked during the mixing
85 Ibid.
86 Joseph Young, ‘‘Merits & Limitations of ZCash: Thoughts of Experts” CNN (29
October 2016), online: <www.ccn.com/merits-limitations-zcash-experts-thoughts/>.
87 Yuncong Zhang et al., ‘‘Z-Channel: Scalable and Efficient Scheme in Zerocash,” (2018)
86 Computers & Security 112.
88 Ben-Sasson et al., supra note84.
89 Ibid.
90 Steven Goldfeder et al. ‘‘When the Cookie Meets the Blockchain: Privacy Risks of Web
Payments via Cryptocurrencies” (2017)arXiv 1708.04748, online: <arxiv.org/pdf/
1708.04748.pdf>.
91 Danny Yang, Jack Gavigan & Zooco Wilcox-O’Hearn, ‘‘Survey of Confidentiality and
Privacy Preserving Technologies for Blockchains” R3 (2016) online: <z.cash/static/
R3_Confidentiality_and_Privacy_Report.pdf>.
92 Ibid.
93 Tim Ruffing, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez and Aniket Kate, ‘‘CoinShuffle: Practical
Decentralized Coin Mixing for Bitcoin” (Proceedings, Part II of the 19th European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Wroclaw, Poland, September 7-11,
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period.94 There is additional risk if the mixer keeps logs of the transactions it
mixes because they could be analyzed to reveal precise linkages between
participants that could then be de-anonymized to reveal personal information.
Moreover, the technical nature of mixing is not impregnable, and vulnerability
will likely increase as analytical abilities develop. One study indicates that mixing
methods (based on CoinJoin — the most common mixing technique do not
always provide anonymity gains for users.95
Ring Confidential Transactions (Ring CTs)
Ring Confidential Transactions are built using ring signature technology,
which was first introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in 2001.96 The
original function was to enable government officials to leak secret information
without revealing who disseminated the information.97 The technology was
amended for public blockchain use by bitcoin core developer Gregory Maxwell
and formally produced in the major cryptocurrency Monero in 2015.98 Ring CTs
are cryptographic digital signatures that protect sender privacy by obscuring the
input side of the transaction amongst arbitrary users — making it
computationally infeasible to determine who the signer of a transaction is.99 In
other words, a message signed with a ring signature is endorsed by someone in a
random group of people, but the actual signer is not distinguishable among the
group.100 In Monero, such ring signatures are composed with outputs from the
real sender’s address, alongside a number of decoy addresses known as
‘‘mixins.”101 Monero provides an additional layer of privacy to this technology
by incorporating ‘stealth addresses’ into the payment scheme.102 A stealth
2014) online: <link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-11212-1> and <petsym-
posium.org/2014/papers/Ruffing.pdf> [Ruffing et al.].
94 Ibid.
95 Felix Konstantin Maurer et al., ‘‘Anonymous CoinJoin Transactions with Arbitrary
Values” (Paper delivered at IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security, and
Privacy in Computing, Sydney, 1 August 2017), online: <ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/
document/8029483>.
96 Bryan Curran, ‘‘What Are Ring Signatures? Providing Privacy for Cryptocurrency” (7




99 Henning Kopp et al., ‘‘Design of a Privacy-Preserving Decentralized File Storage with
Financial Incentives” (Paper delivered at IEEE European Symposium on Security and
Privacy Workshops, Paris, 26 April 2017), online: <ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/
7966965> [Kopp et al.].
100 Curran, supra note 96.
101 Justin Ehrenhofer, ‘‘Response to ‘An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero
Blockchain’, Version 2,” (29 March 2018), online: <getmonero.org/2018/03/29/
response-to-an-empirical-analysis-of-traceability.html>.
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address requires the sender to create ‘‘random one-time addresses for every
transaction on behalf of the recipient.”103 Stealth addresses hide the receiving
addresses of transactions, and Ring CTs hide the sender’s identity and the
transaction amounts. Before a 2017 update to the Monero network, one study
revealed that a ‘‘chain-reaction” analysis could be used to deduce the real
sender’s identities at 85% accuracy.104 The update has since mitigated this de-
anonymization technique by adding more mixins to Monero transactions. The
rate of deductability (i.e. de-anonymization) is now close to 0%.105
While Monero provides valuable privacy controls, its degree of anonymity
coupled with decentralization raises similar concerns to ZeroCash in that it
enables criminal activity, and makes it extremely difficult to determine
accountability and provide oversight. Moreover, the underlying privacy-centric
technologies that Monero utilizes are only applicable (as of the date of this
paper) to public blockchains as alternative payment mechanisms — rather than a
blockchain designed for running decentralized applications like Ethereum.
Storing Personal Data Off-Chain
One simple approach to protecting privacy on public blockchains is to store
all personally identifiable information off chain. This approach provides privacy
by restricting access to the data, but trusted third parties (TTP) are required.
Parties storing personal information off chain would create a hash of the
transaction details on chain.106 By hashing the data, observers would be unable
to glean personal information from the transaction itself; however, this process
requires both counterparties to verify that the hash of data on chain matches
with their records off-chain.107 This allows public blockchain users to keep the
details of their transactions private from other blockchain participants, but it
also undermines many of the advantages of using the blockchain as a shared
ledger.108 After all, what would be the point of using a shared ledger if network
participants need to reference their own off-chain ledgers each time they execute
a transaction.
102 Ibid.
103 Kopp et al., supra note 99.
104 Malte Moser et al., ‘‘An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain”
(2017) arXiv 1704.04299, online: <arxiv.org/pdf/1704.04299/> [Moser et al.].
105 Ibid.
106 A hash function takes an input (or ’message’) and returns a fixed-size alphanumeric
string that serves as the digital fingerprint of that input.
107 Ruffing et al., supra note 93.
108 Ibid.
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Implications of the Privacy-Centric Technology Approach to PIPEDA and
GDPR Compliance
Modern cryptographic proposals for safeguarding privacy rights may
achieve compliance through anonymization. The anonymization approach
presumes that public blockchain operations will comply with, or be exempt
from, legislation like PIPEDA and the GDPR if user data cannot be linked to
user identity. Here the logic follows that if data stored is completely anonymous,
then such data cannot be considered ‘‘personal information” to be processed or
gleaned from parties subject to the legislation. Recital 26 of the GDPR supports
the anonymization approach to privacy when it states:
Principles of data protection should (. . .) not apply to anonymous
information, namely information which does not relate to an identified
or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous
in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable.
This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such
anonymous information, including for statistical or research purpo-
ses.109
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner in Canada takes the same approach to
anonymous information, explaining that anonymous information should not be
considered personal information, ‘‘as long as it is not possible to link that data
back to an identifiable person.”110 Technically speaking, the anonymization of
data should exempt public blockchain operations from these regulations.
However, the reality of technological innovation is such that the privacy-
centric technologies that enable anonymity become outdated and incapable of
masking user identity over prolonged periods of time. History has proven this to
be true with Bitcoin, which many originally believed to be anonymous, and more
recently with Monero, where one study was able to uncover up to 85% of sender
identities (before the 2017 update).111 Moreover, the standalone technical
solutions that embrace anonymity fail to account for other important regulatory
considerations that arise from a transactional paradigm that is decentralized. As
previously mentioned in the analysis of PIPEDA and the GDPR, the
decentralized, ‘peer-to-peer’ nature of operations on public blockchains makes
it extremely difficult to designate accountability for instances of privacy
infringement. For example, while the inability to identify users and read
transactional information should reconcile issues of collection, use, storage
minimization, and the right to be forgotten (because there would be no personal
information to collect, use, store, or forget), it may also burden regulators
seeking to protect society from financial crimes like money laundering, terrorist
financing, and tax evasion. Accordingly, a transactional paradigm that is both
109 GDPR, supra note 57 at recital 26.
110 OPCC Summary, supra note 19
111 Moser et al., supra note 104.
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anonymous and decentralized could generate a marketplace with little oversight
and enforceability. To preserve the security of network participants and respect
privacy rights, a practical approach to regulation will be one that enables
accountability while maintaining transactional anonymity. Such an approach
requires policy that complements the adoption of privacy-centric technology.
PROPOSALS FOR SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY RIGHTS ON PUBLIC
BLOCKCHAINS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This section introduces four policy recommendations that seek to integrate
accountability into a decentralized system that relies on transactional anonymity
to protect user privacy. The purpose of these recommendations is to facilitate
privacy-compliant public blockchain operations while at the same time offer a
viable means for regulators to protect society from unlawful activities like
financial crimes. The recommendations presume that the public blockchain
ecosystem will require transactional anonymity and accountability to flourish;
accordingly, privacy-centric technologies are an assumed tenet of the public
blockchain ecosystem pursuant to the following recommendations.
Regulate Crypto Currency Exchanges
Participation in the current public blockchain ecosystem requires the use of
cryptocurrencies. The only way to purchase cryptocurrencies initially is by using
a cryptocurrency exchange. The exchange is a viable target for generating a
means to hold people accountable because it serves as the primary entry and exit
point to the public blockchain marketplace. A focused regulatory strategy that
mandates exchanges to conduct operations that comply with privacy legislation
could enable accountability in a system of anonymous transactions. Here
exchanges would presume responsibilities similar to banks. Using an exchange
would require participants to meet KYC and AML criteria, and the exchange
would also keep records of user accounts and transactions (these records would
be kept off-chain or on a private sidechain). Nodes to the public blockchain
network would still exist, and third parties would still be able to download data,
but privacy-centric technologies would shield users from bad actors seeking to
take advantage of personal information. Exchanges would be the only third
party with the ability to identify user accounts, and regulators would have to
work with exchanges to police the network. While this may seem burdensome,
the degree of digitization involved would likely mean that much of the regulatory
activity would be automated; only flagged transactions would be brought to the
attention of human regulators. One could look to the automated infringement
notice systems in the copyright context as a benchmark for development. Such
systems are used by universities to protect against illegal downloading and
sharing of files. Another example derived from public-sector surveillance is the
NSA’s ‘‘PRISM” program. PRISM was the analytics program that flagged court
approved terms when they appeared in data processed over the internet and in
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telecommunications.112 Despite the controversy surrounding the PRISM
program in particular, regulators could implement similar analytical
procedures tailored to cryptocurrency exchanges to flag suspicious activity.
The program could scan the backend blockchain ledger and flag information
based on suspicious transaction amounts, locations, and the criminal affiliations
of users. Under this regulatory regime the exchange would only be held
responsible for upholding regulatory requirements by design, and integrating the
analytical program into their network so that regulators could track behind the
scenes information that the program flags as noteworthy or suspicious. It is
important to note however, that while a PRISM like algorithm may provide a
degree of regulatory certainty, such backend access to information could also
challenge the very purpose of public blockchains as a trusted means of
decentralized coordination. For that reason, this recommendation could face
significant resistance from the public blockchain community; a community born
of a philosophy that prioritizes anonymity and the privacy of
communications.113
Mandated Government Registration for Anonymous Accounts
This approach to regulation would require a government entity (or
international body) to be the sole issuer of cryptocurrency wallets. A
cryptocurrency wallet stores the public and private keys which public
blockchain users must hold to receive or send cryptocurrencies. If regulators
exercise control over the wallet distribution process, they could keep records of
public blockchain user accounts and monitor activity on public blockchains
accordingly. Users would still be capable of transacting peer-to-peer, and all
transactional information would remain anonymous. Government control over
wallet distribution would enable regulators to track wallet holder activity
privately. Oversight of this process would have to remain behind closed doors. It
would also likely require cooperation amongst nation states for information
sharing.
Deem Public Blockchain Data Transfers ‘‘Consensual”
Both PIPEDA and the GDPR create an exemption clause for circumstances
where the data subject consents to the processing of their personal information.
Privacy regulators could approach public blockchains as systems where
participation implies consent. Justification for this approach is twofold: (1) the
database is inherently transparent and therefore participants recognize that
transactions will be broadcasted to all nodes in the network, and (2) transactions
occur peer-to-peer, meaning that the data subjects themselves exercise exclusive
112 Zygmunt Bauman et al, ‘‘After Snowden:Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance” (2014)
8:2 Int’l. Political Sociology 121 at 123.
113 For more on this philosophy see: Eric Hughes, ‘‘The CypherpunkManifesto” (9March
1993), online: <www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html>.
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control over their transactions. In the case of PIPEDA, this argument may be
more likely to succeed because the legislation also includes a clause deeming
publicly available information accessible to third parties. Once a transaction is
broadcasted across all nodes, it is made accessible (or publicly available) to any
interested party. The case of the GDPR is more complicated because it does not
reference the public domain as a factor in data processing. Rather, the GDPR
explains that processing is allowed only when it is consented to by the data
subject. Here a regulatory approach would rely on the release of a formal
interpretation of GDPR consent for public blockchains, or a relaxed
interpretation of consent with respect to public blockchain transactions. A
relaxed interpretation could be substantiated by the fact that there may be no
‘data processors’ or ‘data controllers’ on public blockchains other than the users
themselves. Users can be defined as both processors and controllers for all public
blockchain transactions because there is no intermediary to facilitate the
transactional procedure; there is only the network itself. To hold the network
accountable could be considered unreasonable because it is simply a tool to
facilitate peer to peer transactions.
If regulators deem public blockchain data transfers to be an inherently
consensual process, regulation must instead focus on the analysis and use of data
by third parties. Especially heavy penalties could be posited to deter malicious or
invasive use of information gleaned from public blockchain operations to help
counteract the vulnerabilities associated with a transparent system of
transactions. Of course, there have long been problems with public records
being used for nefarious purposes despite the penalties that already exist.
Accordingly, it is uncertain whether heavier penalties will be effective. This
approach would also require regulators to exempt public blockchains from the
right to be forgotten, or at the very least amend the clause to accept ‘corrected’
information as a sufficient response. Information posted on a public blockchain
that a data subject wants erased could be ‘corrected’ by indicating a desired edit
to the information in a subsequent transaction. This approach to correction
would not ‘erase’ the original transaction, rather it would serve an organizational
function by providing more recent, accurate, information for observers.
Establish a ‘Technically Sophisticated User’ Clause
Introducing a technically sophisticated user clause would serve the function
of easing privacy regulation principles for data processors and controllers. By
easing privacy regulation in public blockchain circumstances, regulators would
be able to remain passive, and only intervene in instances of intentional
wrongdoing. Regulators could use a technically sophisticated user clause to
justify their passive approach to privacy regulation in the public blockchain
ecosystem. A passive regulatory approach can be justified by the fact that
participation in this ecosystem requires a much higher degree of complexity and
independence than the traditional transactional paradigm where intermediaries
facilitate actions on our behalf. Creating a wallet and executing a cryptocurrency
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transaction is a more complicated process than sending an e-transfer. Moreover,
editing text into a transaction for purposes of information sharing requires a
degree of technical sophistication that clearly supersedes that required for
sending an email or writing a blog article. Just as accredited investors abide by
different standards for participation in secondary markets, a technically
sophisticated user status could justify a different approach to privacy
regulation on public blockchains.
An important counter to this argument is that if the technology is rolled out
with more mundane consumer transactions, individuals may not know how their
personal information is being stored (in the same way that people typically do
not internalize how accessible their data trails are in other contexts). Should
peripheral technologies develop on blockchain technology that enable more
simplified access to blockchain applications, the once ‘sophisticated’ early
adopters will not be the only ones using the technology. This trend in
technological adoption is commonplace; creating an email account is much
easier today than it was in the 90s, as is accessing the internet. Accordingly,
legislation that adopts a sophisticated user exemption is likely short-sighted. A
more ubiquitous application of blockchain technology in the future may result in
the technology being more invisible to those who use it.
CONCLUSION
Public blockchain features of decentralization and transparency conflict with
contemporary privacy legislation like PIPEDA and the GDPR. Decentralization
often renders the designation of accountability impossible, and transparency
leaves the personal information of data subjects vulnerable. Both PIPEDA and
the GDPR rely on accountable entities like processors and controllers to serve as
both the champions of the regulation and the targets for infringement. This is
complicated on public blockchains because the data subjects themselves often
assume the roles of processors and controllers as transactional ability is
conducted peer-to-peer. However, the primary privacy problem associated with
the transparency and decentralization of the network is derived from the fact that
the analytical ability exists to identify pseudonymous users and personal
information associated with their transactions. While privacy-centric
technologies like zk-SNARK’s, Ring CTs, and mixing techniques, exist to
generate anonymity for transactional information and accounts, this approach is
not a standalone answer to our privacy needs. Anonymity without a
complimentary regulatory response may exacerbate societal vulnerabilities by
creating a marketplace with limited enforceability and oversight. While early
blockchain adopters were looking for a system with less oversight and
government intervention, a degree of regulation is likely required for the
technology to achieve mainstream adoption. Privacy-centric technologies that
provide anonymity require a complementary policy response to establish the
foundation of a system that provides accountability for data processors and
controllers. A grassroots approach to regulation borrows from the GDPR’s
304 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [17 C.J.L.T.]
principle of privacy-by-design and encourages anonymous transactions,
supported by regulatory oversight at the entrance and exit points of the public
blockchain ecosystem. Anonymity will allow participants to utilize the network
without concern for data theft or eavesdropping, whereas the backend ability to
identify participants will deter bad actors from taking advantage of the system
for unlawful purposes like financial crimes or illicit dark web activities. If
regulators and developers work together, privacy law and privacy technologies
can provide the answer to many of the legal issues and economic impediments
facing mainstream public blockchain adoption.
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